We study the efficiency of mechanisms for allocating a divisible resource. Given scalar signals submitted by all users, such a mechanism decides the fraction of the resource that each user will receive and a payment that will be collected from her. Users are self-interested and aim to maximize their utility (defined as their value for the resource fraction they receive minus their payment). Starting with the seminal work of Johari and Tsitsiklis [8], a long list of papers studied the price of anarchy (in terms of the social welfare -the total users' value) of resource allocation mechanisms for a variety of allocation and payment rules. Here, we further assume that each user has a budget constraint that invalidates strategies that yield a payment that is higher than the user's budget. This subtle assumption, which is arguably more realistic, constitutes the traditional price of anarchy analysis meaningless as the set of equilibria may change drastically and their social welfare can be arbitrarily far from optimal. Instead, we study the price of anarchy using the liquid welfare benchmark that measures efficiency taking budget constraints into account. We show a tight bound of 2 on the liquid price of anarchy of the well-known Kelly mechanism and prove that this result is essentially best possible among all multi-user resource allocation mechanisms. This comes in sharp contrast to the no-budget setting where there are mechanisms that considerably outperform Kelly in terms of social welfare and even achieve full efficiency. In our proofs, we exploit the particular structure of worst-case games and equilibria, which also allows us to design (nearly) optimal two-player mechanisms by solving simple differential equations.
INTRODUCTION
Resource allocation is an ubiquitous task in computing systems and often sets algorithmic challenges to their design. As such, resource allocation problems have received much attention by the algorithmic community for decades. The recent emergence of large-scale distributed systems with non-cooperative users that compete for access to scarce resources has led to game-theoretic treatments of resource allocation.
In this paper, we study a particular simple class of resource allocation mechanisms that aim to distribute a divisible resource (such as bandwidth of a communication link, CPU time, storage space, etc.) by auctioning it off to different users as follows. Each user is asked to submit a scalar signal. Given the submitted signals, the mechanism decides the fraction of the resource that will be allocated to each user, as well as the payment that will be received from each of them. A This work was partially supported by Caratheodory research grant E.114 from the University of Patras and by a PhD scholarship from the Onassis Foundation. We would like to thank George Christodoulou and Alkmini Sgouritsa for fruitful discussions in early stages of this work. typical example is a mechanism that has been proposed by Kelly [10] (henceforth called the Kelly mechanism; see also [11] ), according to which the fraction of the resource allocated to each user is proportional to the user's signal, and the signal itself is her payment.
The users are self-interested. Following the standard modeling assumptions in the related literature, the value of each user for a resource fraction is given by a private valuation function. The above definition of resource allocation mechanisms allows the users to act strategically in the sense that the signal they select to submit is such that their utility (value for the fraction of the resource they receive minus payment) is maximized. Naturally, this behavior defines a strategic game among the users, who act as players. Soon after the definition of the Kelly mechanism, a series of papers studied the existence and uniqueness of pure Nash equilibria (snapshots of player strategies, in which the signal of each player maximizes her own utility) of the induced games [6, 13, 16] and quantified their inefficiency [8] using the notion of the price of anarchy [12] .
In particular, Johari and Tsitsiklis [8] used the social welfare (i.e., the total value of the players for their received fraction of the resource) as an efficiency benchmark and proved that the social welfare at any equilibrium is at least 3/4 times the optimal social welfare. This translates into a price of anarchy bound of 4/3, which is tight. The paper of Johari and Tsitsiklis [8] sparked subsequent research on other resource allocation mechanisms, that use different (non-proportional) allocation rules or payments.
technical assumptions for player valuations and mechanism characteristics; see Section 2). The Kelly mechanism is proved to have an almost best possible LPoA of exactly 2. In contrast, the mechanism of Sanghavi and Hajek [20] (henceforth called SH) has an LPoA of 3. Improved bounds are possible for two players. We design the two-player PYS resource allocation mechanism E2-PYS that has an LPoA of 1.792; this bound is optimal among a very broad class of mechanisms. We also design the two-player mechanism E2-SR that achieves an almost optimal LPoA bound of at most 1.529; this mechanism uses different payments. See Table 1 Our results exploit a particular structure of worst-case (in terms of LPoA) games and their equilibria. We prove that for every resource allocation mechanism, the worst-case LPoA is obtained at instances in which players have affine valuation functions. In addition, all players besides one have finite budgets and play strategies that imply payments that are either zero or equal to their budget, while a single player has infinite budget and a signal that nullifies the derivative of her utility. Compared to an analogous characterization for the no-budget case (with linear valuation functions and player signals that all nullify their utility derivatives), first observed by Johari and Tsitsiklis [8] for the Kelly mechanism and later extended to all resource allocation mechanisms, the structure in our characterization is much richer and the proof is considerably more complicated. The characterization contains so much information that the LPoA bounds follow rather easily; the extreme example is the proof of our best LPoA bound of 2 for the Kelly mechanism which is only a few lines long. It can also be used in the design of new mechanisms; for example, the design and analysis of our two-player mechanisms E2-PYS and E2-SR follow by simple first-order differential equations, which would never have been identified without our characterization. And, furthermore, under assumptions about the resource allocation mechanisms (e.g., concave allocations and convex payments), the LPoA bound is automatically proved to be tight without providing any explicit lower bound instance.
Other related work. As an efficiency benchmark, the liquid welfare has been studied recently in different contexts such as in the design of truthful mechanisms (see [4, 14, 15] ) and in the analysis of combinatorial Walrasian equilibria with budgets [5] . In the context of the price of anarchy, it was considered recently in simultaneous first price auctions by Azar et al. [1] .
Caragiannis and Voudouris [2] were the first to prove that the liquid price of anarchy of the Kelly mechanism is constant. In particular, they showed LPoA upper and lower bounds of 2.78 and 2, respectively. The lower bound is essentially proved again here (see Theorem 5.1) with a completely different and more interesting technique. Christodoulou et al. [3] improved the LPoA upper bound to 2.618 and extended the results to more general settings involving multiple resources. Prior to these two papers, Syrgkanis and Tardos [21] proved that the social welfare at equilibria of the Kelly mechanism is at most a constant factor away from the optimal liquid welfare. In contrast to the analysis techniques in the current paper, the analysis of the Kelly mechanism by Caragiannis and Voudouris [2] , Christodoulou et al. [3] and Syrgkanis and Tardos [21] is closer in spirit to the smoothness template (see [18, 19] ) and is based on bounding the utility of each player by the utility she would have when deviating to appropriate signal strategies. Their results hold for more general equilibrium concepts such as coarse-correlated or Bayes-Nash equilibria. Our LPoA bounds in the current paper hold specifically for pure Nash equilibria, but are superior and tight.
Roadmap. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We begin with definitions and notation in Section 2. Our lower bound on the LPoA of any resource allocation mechanism appears in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to proving the structural characterization of worst-case resource allocation games and equilibria. Then, in Section 5 we present tight bounds on the liquid price of anarchy for the Kelly and SH mechanisms. In Section 6, we present our two-player mechanisms E2-PYS and E2-SR. We conclude with open problems and a discussion on possible extensions in Section 7.
DEFINITIONS, NOTATION, AND EXAMPLES
We consider a single divisible resource of unit size that is distributed among n users by a resource allocation mechanism M. The mechanism M consists of
is the unit n-simplex and 0 = (0, ..., 0), and • a payment function p M : R n ≥0 → R n ≥0 , and works as follows. Each user i submits a signal s i ∈ R ≥0 , and the mechanism M allocates a fraction of д M i (s) of the resource to each user i and asks her for a payment of p M i (s), where s = (s 1 , ..., s n ) denotes the vector formed by all signals.
Some important properties of allocation and payment functions are as follows. First, they are anonymous: any permutation of the entries of the input signal vector results in the same permutation of the output. So, all users get equal resource shares and are asked for equal payments when they submit identical signals. The mechanism does not allocate any fraction and does not ask for any payment from a user that submits a zero signal. By convention, when some user is the only one with a non-zero signal, she gets the whole resource and is asked for a payment of zero. Let (y, s −i ) denote the signal vector in which user i has a signal of y and the remaining users have their signals as in s. Viewed as univariate functions (of variable y), the functions д M i (y, s −i ) and p M i (y, s −i ) are increasing and differentiable in R ≥0 (with the exception of (y, s −i ) = 0).
Each user i has
• a monotone non-decreasing, concave, and differentiable 1 valuation function v i : [0, 1] → R ≥0 ; v i (x) represents the value that user i has for a resource fraction of x; • a budget c i ∈ R ≥0 ∪ {+∞}, which restricts (i.e., upper-bounds) her payment to the mechanism. Her utility from the mechanism is defined as the value she gets for the fraction she is given minus her payment, i.e.,
To capture the fact that budgets impose hard constraints to the users, we technically assume that
The users act strategically as utility maximizers and engage as players into a strategic resource allocation game G M that is induced by mechanism M. A (pure Nash) equilibrium is a signal vector s such that, when viewed as a univariate function of variable y, u M i (y, s −i ) is maximized for y = s i , i.e., no player can increase her utility by unilaterally deviating to submitting a different signal.
We denote by eq(G M ) the set of all equilibria of game G M . By the definition and properties of the allocation and payment functions, the signal vector 0 cannot be an equilibrium as (by the conventions mentioned above) any player has the incentive to unilaterally deviate and get the whole resource without paying anything. We use X n as an abbreviation of the set R n ≥0 \ {0}. Due to the budget constraints, we have three different cases for the strategy of player i at an equilibrium s ∈ eq(G M ) (assuming a non-trivial budget c i > 0) and for the corresponding value of the derivative of her utility. In particular, the derivative
Note that nullification of the utility derivative does not necessarily imply maximization of utility.
We are interested in studying the effect of strategic behavior to the efficiency of a mechanism. An efficiency benchmark that has been used extensively in the literature is the social welfare. For an allocation d ∈ Q ∪ 0 of a resource allocation game G M , the social welfare is defined as
where n is the number of players in G M and v i is the valuation function of player i. Then, the inefficiency of equilibria of game G M can be measured by its price of anarchy which is defined as
where SW * (G M ) denotes the maximum social welfare over all allocations of G M . However, the definition of the social welfare does not take into account the possibly finite budgets that the players may have. Therefore, we instead use the liquid welfare as our efficiency benchmark. The liquid welfare of an allocation d is defined as
where c i is the budget of player i. Clearly, when players have no budget constraints, the liquid welfare coincides with the social welfare. The liquid price of anarchy of a resource allocation game
where LW * (G M ) denotes the maximum liquid welfare over all allocations of game G M . We use the overloaded term LPoA(M) to denote the liquid price of anarchy of the resource allocation mechanism M. This is defined as the maximum (or, more formally, the supremum) liquid price of anarchy over all games that are induced by mechanism M.
Examples of resource allocation mechanisms. Let us devote some space to the definition of some well-known mechanisms from the literature. An important class of resource allocation mechanisms is that of pay-your-signal mechanisms (PYS, for short). When at least two players submit non-zero signals, a PYS mechanism charges each player i a payment equal to the signal s i that she submits. Otherwise, PYS mechanisms follow the general convention that we have defined at the beginning of Section 2, and do not charge any payment to any player.
The most popular PYS mechanism is the Kelly mechanism that was introduced in [10] . This mechanism allocates the resource proportionally to the players' signals (this is why it is also known as the proportional allocation mechanism in the related literature), i.e.,
The Kelly mechanism has played a central role in the related literature; for the no-budget setting, Johari and Tsitsiklis [8] proved that its price of anarchy is 4/3. In their attempt to design the PYS mechanism with the lowest possible price of anarchy, Sanghavi and Hajek [20] defined the allocation function
We will refer to the PYS mechanism that uses this allocation function as SH. For two players, the allocation function has a very simple definition as д SH 1 (s) = s 1 2s 2 when s 1 ≤ s 2 , and д SH 1 (s) = 1 − s 2 2s 1 otherwise. Sanghavi and Hajek [20] proved that the two-player version of the SH mechanism has an optimal (among all PYS mechanisms) price of anarchy of 8/7 and provided experimental evidence that the price of anarchy of the n-player version is only marginally higher. As we will see later in Section 5, the comparison between Kelly and SH yields a drastically different result when players have budgets and the liquid welfare is used as the efficiency benchmark.
Other interesting classes of mechanisms use proportional allocation but different payments. Among them, a mechanism defined by Maheswaran and Basar [17] uses the class of payment functions
is an increasing function (such as h M (z) = z; Maheswaran and Basar [17] suggest several other choices for h M ). These mechanisms have the remarkable property of full efficiency at equilibria in the no-budget setting (i.e., they have price of anarchy equal to 1). Independently from Maheswaran and Basar [17] , Johari and Tsitsiklis [9] as well as Yang and Hajek [22] presented resource allocation mechanisms that achieve full efficiency in the no-budget setting. All these mechanisms can be thought of as adaptations of the well-known VCG paradigm.
A LOWER BOUND FOR ALL MECHANISMS
The fact that the mechanisms of Maheswaran and Basar [17] , Johari and Tsitsiklis [9] , and Yang and Hajek [22] achieve full efficiency seems surprising, as resource allocation mechanisms do not have direct access to the valuation functions of the players. Still, the definition of these mechanisms is such that the incentives of the players are fully aligned to the global goal of maximizing the social welfare. In a sense, these mechanisms manage to achieve access to the valuation functions indirectly. In contrast, when players have budget constraints, we show below that a liquid price of anarchy equal to 1 is not possible. This means that resource allocation mechanisms fail to "mine" any kind of information about the budget values of the players, while budgets affect the strategic behavior of the players crucially.
Theorem 3.1. Every n-player resource allocation mechanism has liquid price of anarchy at least 2 − 1/n.
Proof. Let M be any n-player resource allocation mechanism that uses an allocation function valuation function and budget, the liquid (or social) welfare at equilibrium is optimal and, hence, LPoA(G M 1 ) = 1. Recall that, for every signal vector y = (y 1 , ..., y n ), the utility of player i is defined as Figure 1 ). Observe that the modified utility of player i i * as a function of a signal vector y is nowũ
Also, since the utility of player i i * is non-negative at the equilibrium s of game G M 1 , we have that p M i (s) ≤ d i =c i , meaning that player i can also afford this payment in game G M 2 . Hence, s is an equilibrium in G M 2 as well (and, again, M returns the same allocation d).
Its liquid welfare is i min{ṽ i (d i ),c i } = i d i = 1 while the optimal liquid welfare is at least 1 + i i * d i , achieved at the allocation according to which the whole resource is given to player i * . Hence, we conclude that the liquid price of anarchy of M is figure) represent the equilibrium in both games, and the optimal allocation in game G M 1 . The optimal allocation in G M 2 is represented by the red points (i.e., point (1, 1) in the left figure and point (0, d i ) in the right one).
THE STRUCTURE OF WORST-CASE GAMES AND EQUILIBRIA
In this section, we prove our structural characterization. Given an n-player resource allocation mechanism M (with allocation and payment functions д M and p M , respectively), signal vector s ∈ X n , and an integer j ∈ [n], define the n-player game G M (s, j) as follows. Every player has the affine valuation functionṽ
for every player i j. In the following, we show that the games defined in this way are in a sense extreme in terms of the liquid price of anarchy of mechanism M. Lemma 4.1. Let G M 1 be an n-player resource allocation game that is induced by a mechanism M with LPoA(G M 1 ) > 1. Let s ∈ X n be an equilibrium of G M 1 of minimum liquid welfare. Then, there 
, wherex = (x 1 , ...,x n ) denotes the allocation withx i * = 1 andx i = 0 for i i * .
Proof. Consider an n-player resource allocation game G M 1 that is induced by mechanism M. Let v i and c i be the valuation function and budget of player i, respectively. Let s ∈ X n be the equilibrium of game G M 1 of minimum liquid welfare. We denote by x the optimal allocation in G M 1 . Without loss of generality, we assume that, for every player i, x i = 0 if v i (0) > c i and v i (x i ) ≤ c i otherwise, and we relax the allocation definition to n i=1 x i ≤ 1; this does not constrain the optimal liquid welfare which is LW(
for the resource fraction allocated to player i in s; let d = (d 1 , ..., d n ).
We partition the players into the following three sets:
• Set A consists of players i with v i (d i ) < c i and signal s i such that the derivative of their utility is equal to 0.
• Set B consists of players i with signal s i = 0 (hence, d i = 0) and negative utility derivative such that v i (0) < c i .
• Set Γ consists of players i with signal s i such that v i (d i ) ≥ c i . First, observe that sets A and B cannot be both empty, since it would then be LW(d,
, and the liquid price of anarchy of G M 1 would be exactly 1, contradicting the assumption of the lemma. So, in the following, we assume that at least one of A and B is non-empty. Now consider the games G M (s, j) for j ∈ [n] and let i * = arg max j ∈A∪B {λ M j (s)}. We will show that
and we will furthermore show that the allocationx satisfies
In this way (recall that s is the equilibrium of minimum liquid welfare in game G M 1 and d is the resulting allocation), we will have
, as desired. The inequality follows by (1) and (2). The last equality follows since all players in G M (s, i * ) besides i * have always their value capped by their budget, which is equal to their payment. Inequality (1) is due to the fact that the contribution of each player to the liquid welfare at s can only decrease between the two games. Indeed, if player i * belongs to B, she has zero value in game G M (s, i * ). If she belongs to A, then her utility derivative is nullified and, hence, v Let
denote the contribution of player i to the expression LW(x, G M 1 ) − LW(x, G M (s, i * )) − LW(d, G M 1 ) + LW(d, G M (s, i * )). Then, in order to prove inequality (2) it suffices to prove that i δ (i) ≤ 0. • For player i * , we have that v i * (d i * ) < c i * . Using the inequality v i * (x i * ) ≤ v i * (d i * )+v ′ i * (d i * )(x i * − d i * ) due to the concavity of the valuation function v i * and the factx i * = 1, we have that
. Now, we observe that (for such observations, we follow the reasoning in the caption of Figure 2 
, and we obtain
• For all players i i * , observe that their value is always capped by their budget in G M (s, i * ).
For player i i * belonging to A or to B we have that either λ
. Hence, using the concavity of v i and the fact thatx i = 0, we obtain that
where the last inequality follows since λ M i (s) ≤ λ M i * (s), due to the definition of player i * . Otherwise, if i ∈ Γ, we have
Hence, summing over all players, and using inequalities (3), (4) and (5) as well as the fact that i x i ≤ 1, we obtain i δ (i) ≤ 0, and the proof is complete. □ We are now ready to prove the main result of this section. Lemma 4.2. Let M be an n-player resource allocation mechanism with allocation and payment functions д M and p M , respectively. Then, its liquid price of anarchy is
If, in addition, s ∈ X n is always an equilibrium of game G M (s, 1), (6) holds with equality. Proof. Let weq(G M ) be the set of equilibria of minimum liquid welfare in game G M . Using the definition of the liquid price of anarchy, Lemma 4.1, and the anonymity of resource allocation mechanisms, we have
. Now, if s ∈ eq(G M (s, 1)) for every s ∈ X n , by just considering the games G M (s, 1) induced by mechanism M, we have
and (6) holds with equality. The last inequality follows by comparing the liquid welfare at s to the liquid welfare of the allocation which gives the whole resource to player 1. Recall that all players besides player 1 have always their value capped by their budget in game G M (s, 1). □ Lemma 4.2 is extremely powerful. It says that no game-theoretic reasoning is needed anymore for proving upper bounds on the LPoA and, instead, all we have to do is to solve the corresponding mathematical program. Furthermore, it can be used to prove lower bounds on the LPoA without providing any explicit construction. In this case, we just need to show that the condition s ∈ eq(G M (s, 1)) holds; then the tight lower bound follows by solving the same mathematical program.
Before we continue with the rest of our results, we define the class C of mechanisms M that use concave allocation functions д M and convex payment functions p M . Observe that both Kelly and SH (as well as the E2-PYS mechanism presented in Section 6) are members of this class. With our next lemma, we prove that the condition s ∈ eq(G M (s, 1) ) is satisfied for any C mechanism M. This will allows us to prove lower bounds in the upcoming sections. Lemma 4.3. For any n-player resource allocation mechanism M ∈ C and s ∈ X n , s ∈ eq(G M (s, 1) ).
Proof. Consider any C mechanism M that uses a concave allocation function д M and a convex payment function p M . By the definition of game G M (s, 1), the utility of any player i, as a function of her signal y, is
Observe that, by the definition of λ M i (s), the signal s i nullifies the utility derivative of player i, and since (s, 1) ) is satisfied.
Theorem 5.1. The liquid price of anarchy of the Kelly mechanism is 2.
Proof. Let s ∈ X n and C = i ≥2 s i . Since Kelly is PYS, we have that i ≥2 p (y,s −1 ) ∂y = C (y+C) 2 . Also, since the mechanism belongs to class C, by Lemma 4.3, we have that s ∈ eq(G Kelly (s, 1) ). Hence, λ 
as desired. □ Notice that our proof of Theorem 5.1 is surprisingly short. The proof exploits Lemma 4.2 with (6) holding with equality and, as such, it simultaneously provides a tight (upper and lower) bound. In contrast, our analysis for the SH mechanism is slightly more involved. This is mainly due to the more complicated definition of the allocation function (see Section 2), which requires to distinguish between two cases, depending on whether s 1 < max ℓ s ℓ or not. Both cases lead to inequalities that provide only an upper bound on the LPoA of the SH mechanism in the proof of Theorem 5.2. Then, in Theorem 5.3, we easily prove a matching lower bound by restricting our attention to the 2-player version of the mechanism. Actually, the proof can be thought of as providing a tight (i.e., not only lower, but also upper) bound on the LPoA of the 2-player version of the SH mechanism.
Theorem 5.2. The liquid price of anarchy of the SH mechanism is at most 3.
Proof. We will use Lemma 4.2 and upper-bound the ratio in the RHS of (6) by 3. Define C = i ≥2 s i . First, let s ∈ X n with s 1 < max ℓ s ℓ . Let arg max ℓ s ℓ = i * 1. Then, by the definition of SH and the definition of λ SH 1 (s) in (6), we have
and using the Bernoulli inequality stating that 1 − γt ≥ (1 − t) γ for t ≤ 1 and γ ∈ [0, 1], (7) yields
Since SH is PYS, i ≥2 p SH i (s) = C. Using this observation together with the last inequality, we obtain
The inequalities follow since λ SH 1 (s) д SH 1 (s) ≥ 0, s 1 ≥ 0, and s i * ≤ C. Now, let s ∈ X n with s 1 = max ℓ s ℓ . In this case, д SH 1 (s) is defined as
and ∂д SH 1 (y, s −1 ) ∂y
.
Using the definition of λ SH 1 (s) in (6), this last inequality implies that
Also, by applying the Bernoulli inequality at the RHS of the definition of д SH 1 (s), we obtain
Now, we have
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The two first inequalities follow by (9) and (10), respectively, and the last one is obvious since s 1 , C ≥ 0. Now, the upper bound follows by Lemma 4.2 using (8) and (11) . □ Theorem 5.3. The liquid price of anarchy of the SH mechanism is at least 3.
Proof. It suffices to restrict our attention to the 2-player version of the mechanism. Let s ∈ X 2 with s 1 ≤ s 2 . In this case д SH 1 (s) = s 1 2s 2 which implies that λ SH 1 (s) = 2s 2 . Since the SH mechanism belongs to class C, by Lemma 4.3, we have that s ∈ eq(G SH (s, 1) ). Using Lemma 6, we obtain LPoA(SH) ≥ sup s∈X 2 :s 1 ≤s 2 3s 2
The proof is complete. □
TWO-PLAYER MECHANISMS
As we saw in Theorem 5.1, the Kelly mechanism has an LPoA of exactly 2 even in the case of two players. In contrast, our lower bound of 3/2 for 2-player mechanisms in Theorem 3.1 seems to leave room for improvements. Such improvements are indeed possible as we show with the mechanisms that we present in this section. Interestingly, the E2-PYS mechanism that is defined in the following is also proved to have optimal LPoA among all 2-player PYS mechanisms with concave allocation functions. Let β ≈ 1.792 be the solution of the equation 1 β − 1 β exp − β β −1 = 1 2 and define mechanism E2-PYS to be the PYS 2-player mechanism that uses the allocation function
for player i ∈ {1, 2} and (non-zero) signal vector s = (s 1 , s 2 ). Due to the definition of β, E2-PYS is a well-defined resource allocation mechanism: it is anonymous, with an increasing and differentiable allocation function, which allocates the whole resource when some player has non-zero signal. Moreover, E2-PYS belongs to class C: the allocation function can be seen to be concave (see also Figure 3 ) and the payment function is, of course, convex. The LPoA bound statement for E2-PYS follows.
Theorem 6.1. The liquid price of anarchy of the E2-PYS mechanism is β ≈ 1.792.
Proof. We will prove the theorem using Lemma 4.2. Let s ∈ X 2 . Due to Lemma 4.3, we have that s ∈ eq(G E2-PYS (s, 1)). We distinguish between two cases. First, assume that s 1 ≤ s 2 ; in this case,
Using ( 
The inequality follows since the quantity at its left is decreasing in s 1 /s 2 (its derivative with respect to s 1 /s 2 can be shown by tedious calculations to be non-positive for s 1 /s 2 ≥ 1) and, hence, it is upper-bounded by its value for s 1 /s 2 = 1; this is equal to β by its definition. The theorem follows by Lemma 4.2 using (12) and (13) . □ We remark that a preliminary analysis similar to the first half of the proof of Theorem 6.1 inspired the design of the E2-PYS mechanism (as well as that of E2-SR mechanism that is defined later) at first place. By keeping the allocation function as the unknown and requiring that the RHS of (6) is equal to some value α for all signal vectors s ∈ X 2 with s 1 ≤ s 2 (this is essentially what (12) captures), we obtained a first-order differential equation which, using the appropriate conditions so that the resulting mechanism is valid, led to E2-PYS (for α = β). Luckily, for signal vectors s ∈ X 2 with s 1 > s 2 , we were able to show that the RHS of (6) is at most α; see inequality (13) .
We now show that E2-PYS has optimal LPoA among 2-player PYS mechanisms in class C. The proof makes use of Lemma 4.2 and a simple differential inequality that involves the allocation function. Theorem 6.2. Any 2-player PYS mechanism with concave allocation function has liquid price of anarchy at least β ≈ 1.792.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, assume that there exists a PYS mechanism M that has liquid price of anarchy β ′ < β. 
and, hence, is decreasing in the interval [1, 2] . □ Let us now define a non-PYS mechanism that has considerably better LPoA than E2-PYS and almost matches the lower bound of 3/2 from Theorem 3.1 for 2-player mechanisms. Let γ ≈ 1.529 be the solution of the equation 1 γ − 1 γ exp − γ 2(γ −1) = 1 2 and define mechanism E2-SR to be the 2-player mechanism that uses the allocation function (see Figure 3 for a comparison of the allocation functions of Kelly, SH, E2-PYS, and E2-SR) . Recall that we follow the general conventions from Section 2; hence, the payments are 0 when some of the signals is equal to zero. Due to the definition of γ , E2-SR is a well-defined resource allocation mechanism. However, observe that E2-SR does not belong to class C (the allocation function is not concave; see Figure 3 ) and the condition s ∈ eq(G E2-SR (s, 1)) is not guaranteed to be satisfied. Next, we will prove an upper bound on the LPoA of E2-SR. The proof follows in a very similar way to the proof of Theorem 6.1 with the exception that it does not provide a tight bound. Theorem 6.3. The liquid price of anarchy of the E2-SR mechanism is at most γ ≈ 1.529.
Proof. We will prove the theorem by mimicking the proof of Theorem 6.1. Let s ∈ X 2 . We distinguish between two cases. First, assume that s 1 ≤ s 2 ; in this case
and ∂д E2-SR 1 (y, s 2 ) ∂y [3] present LPoA bounds for Kelly, but these are not known to be tight. We conjecture that the proof of tight LPoA bounds over more general equilibrium concepts for any resource allocation mechanism should exploit the structure of worst-case games and equilibria as we did in the current paper for pure Nash equilibria. Unfortunately, extending our characterization from Section 4 to more general equilibrium concepts seems elusive at this point. There are several interesting extensions of our setting that could be considered. Budget-aware mechanisms, which have access to the budget value of each player, constitute a first such extension. Of course, our analysis for mechanisms Kelly, SH, E2-PYS, and E2-SR carries over to this case. In contrast, our lower bound (Theorem 3.1) is not true anymore. The proof constructs two games, in which almost every player has different budgets. The main property we have exploited in that proof (for non-budget-aware mechanisms) is that the strategic behavior of the players results in the same set of equilibria in both games. This argument fails for budget-aware mechanisms; a small change in the budget of a single player could be enough to alter the set of equilibria. So, in principle, one might hope even for full efficiency at equilibria (i.e., LPoA equal to 1) in this case, analogously to the results of Maheswaran and Basar [17] , Johari and Tsitsiklis [9] , and Yang and Hajek [22] in the no-budget setting. Interestingly, our next statement rules out this possibility. Theorem 7.1. For n ≥ 2, every n-player budget-aware resource allocation mechanism has liquid price of anarchy at least 4/3.
Proof. Let M be any n-player budget-aware resource allocation mechanism that uses an allocation function д M and a payment function p M . Let s = (s 1 , ..., s n ) be an equilibrium of the game G M 1 induced by M for players with valuations v i (x) = x for i ∈ {1, 2} and v i (x) = 0 for i ≥ 3, and budgets c i = 1 for every i ∈ [n]. Assume that the allocation returned by M at this equilibrium is d = (d 1 , ..., d n ). Without loss of generality, we may assume that one of the first two players (say, player 1) gets a resource share of at most 1/2.
Recall that, for every signal vector y, the utility of any player i is defined as u M i (y) = v i (д M i (y)) − p M i (y). Now, consider the game G M 2 where player 2 has the modified valuation functionṽ 2 (x) = 1+x while all other players are as in G M 1 ; the budgets are the same in both games and are known to the mechanism. Observe that the modified utility of player 2 is nowũ M 2 (y) =ṽ 2 (д M 2 (y)) − p M 2 (y) = u M 2 (y) + 1. Hence, s is an equilibrium in G M 2 as well and M returns the same allocation d again. Clearly, due to the definition of the valuation functions, the contribution of players i ≥ 3 in the liquid welfare (in any state of the game) is zero. Hence, the liquid welfare at equilibrium is min{ṽ 1 (d 1 ), c 1 } + min{ṽ 2 (d 2 ), c 2 } = d 1 + 1 ≤ 3/2, while the optimal liquid welfare is equal to 2, achieved at the allocation according to which the whole resource is given to player 1. We conclude that the liquid price of anarchy of M is LPoA(M) ≥ LPoA(G M 2 ) ≥ 4/3, as desired. □ In spite of the lower bound in Theorem 7.1, whether budget-aware resource allocation mechanisms can have an LPoA better than 2 − 1/n is an important open problem. This seems to be a technically non-trivial and extremely challenging task though.
Another possible extension of our setting could be to allow the players to declare their budgets to the mechanism in addition to their scalar signal. Taking this approach to its extreme, one could imagine resource allocation mechanisms which ask the players to submit multi-dimensional signals. At first glance, this seems to lead to much more powerful mechanisms than the ones we have considered here. Surprisingly, this higher level of expressiveness has no consequences to the LPoA at all and our lower bound of 2 − 1/n captures such mechanisms as well. Indeed, by inspecting the two games used in the proof of Theorem 3.1, we can verify that the same signal vector (no matter whether signals are single-or multi-dimensional) leads to the same allocation by the mechanism Session 10b: Mechanism Design V ACM EC'18, June 18-22, 2018, Ithaca, NY, USA. and the same strategic behavior of the players in both games. This observation applies to the proof of Theorem 7.1 as well.
Finally, we believe that the liquid welfare is an appropriate efficiency benchmark for auctions with budget-constrained players. The recent paper by Azar et al. [1] studies the LPoA of simultaneous first-price auctions; obtaining similar results for other auction formats (e.g., see the recent survey of Roughgarden et al. [19] ) is certainly important. Needless to say, we do not expect that the liquid welfare is unique as a measure of efficiency in settings with budgets. Defining alternative efficiency benchmarks and studying the price of anarchy with respect to them would shed extra light to the strengths and weaknesses of auction mechanisms.
